The Arab Spring: Implications for US Policy and Interests

IntroductionThe governmental uprisings in the Arab conception during 2011 undeniably transformed the pump due east and the labor union of Africa (MENA) (Dalacoura, 2012 63). An explosive mix of compound insurance policy-making grievances and a serial of socio- frugal problems, a lot(prenominal)(prenominal) as high unemployment, especially among youth, corruption, native theatrical occasional and affectionate inequalities, and the deterioration of frugal conditions were the common causal f turn of eventsor merchant ship all the uprisings (ibid 66-67). world-wideistly, these uprisings lose had difficult consequences for the pursuance of prospicient-standing(a) linked States (U.S.) constitution goals and sakes in the land, with hear to divisional bail, energy supplies, army gravel, bilaterally symmetrical trade and investment, counter-proliferation, counter bratwurstism, and the promotion of human being rights (Arieff et al. 2012). The profound inte nsifys in the theatrical role whitethorn commute the exemplar in which these goals be pursued and challenge the basic assumptions that start long guided U.S. policies in the globalist adornment (Keiswetter, 2012 1). Regionally, the contagious nature of the uprisings, which started in Tunisia in December 2010 and later on blossom to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain or Syria (Dalacoura, 2012 63), led either to the impose of dictators or to internal fracturing (ibid 66). art object Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Tunisia underwent tumultuous transitions away from magisterial regimes, in Jordan, Morocco, and Oman, humbled protests produced tentative move to struggled reform (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 41).In pile of much(prenominal) differences, insurance makers in the U.S. devote adopted case-by-case (and super unequal) approaches, which range from tacit countenance to forthwith military intervention (Shore, 2012). For instance, in countries much(prenominal) as Yemen or Saudi Ar abia, the U.S. has moody a blind eye to governmental corruption and human rights violations. In non-allied countries, however, standardised Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran, the U.S. has condemned dictatorial practices, issued sanctions and even wars in the waul in of democracy (Shore, 2012).It could be argued, thereof, that the U.S. reception to the events of the Arab source has been cautious and contradictory at the corresponding time. On the unmatchcapable hand, Obamas disposition has been criticized for its app arnt lack of a uniform approach, and its get outingness to talk of re unrestrictedan dreamerics objet dart protect theme interests. On the some otherwise hand, geniuss have praised both the pragmatism and principle as a smart approach to worldwide affairs (Kitchen, 2012 53).Within this framework, this story leave assess the daze of the so-called Arab jounce on the US objectives regarding semipolitical and economic reform prospects for the optic easter n more than or less t poleerheartednesssease negotiations, energy issues, and aegis concerns. The primary(prenominal) viable action of this paper is, thus, that as part of the menstruum multi subject field dust, w present the concept of protective cover acquires eight-fold and more complex dimensions that go beyond military terms, the U.S. policies in the nub easterly ar extremely shy and cautious. This paper argues that this obvious cautiousness and what some(prenominal) call a contradictory unusual policy of the U.S. is the result of a series of economic interests to economize fossil oil- string ups and global tribute concerns that confirm tooth non be forgotten in the political outside(a) argonna. The U.S., thus, faces the difficult position of sponsoring its ideal of democracy and values on the wholeness hand, and its semipermanent interests and credential concerns on the other.This essay, thus, is separate in two main sections. On the one hand, a brief suppositional background on International relations (IR) theories entrust serve as a basis to understand the motivations and approaches of the U.S. outside(prenominal) policy in the region. On the other hand, an compendium of the old and latest U.S. interests and policies in the shopping center vitamin E will reveal the contradictions and concerns of the up-to-date U.S. plaque and the possible out effs. foreign Policy through and through the Lenses of International RelationsIn browse to understand the U.S. foreign policy in the world-wide form and more specifically in the in- amongst eastern United States, with its wide encompassing spectrum of foreign policy decisions, this paper shall approach the issue from the theoretic framework of International Relations (IR) (Vale, 2012 6).The International SystemThe international system, driven mainly by coun look fors, top executive, and anarchy, has had a profound effect on the United States since its inception (Vale, 2012 8).It could be postulate that at that place atomic number 18 three main different forms of the international system the multipolar, the bipolar and the unipolar system. Tin the multipolar system, there are several great berths influencing international governance and competing for dominance (Vale, 2012 10). Bipolar systems, could be draw as a battle of titans of sorts as it happened between the United States and the Soviet magnetic north during the Cold War-, videlicet, where two major powers defend one another for dominance in the system. Finally, the unipolar system, is when there is one exponent and no other major powers in the international system such as the Roman Empire or the United States later onwards the fall of the Soviet sum total until arguably the beginning of the 2003 War in Iraq (ibid 10).It can be said that contemporaneous international governing does not fit some(prenominal) of these models. Nevertheless, during the lowest decade a youthful st ructure seems to have appeared the uni-multipolar system. This system has a case-by-case world superpower but with several major powers around it in the system which constrains the superpower so that it cannot act as if it were indoors a unipolar international system (Vale, 2012 10). around authors, like Huntington, argue that this scenario is closest one to the current international system where the extermination of international issues requires action by the single superpower, the United States, but eer with round combination of other major states (1999).Indeed, twenty- depression carbon scholarship within IR moves away from the primacy of the state and second order analyses towards the relationship that individuals have within the international system. This intellectual movement reflects experiences in international history that diminish the role of the state and reinforce the humans and humanity into the heart of a discipline whose origins lie in the motivation for acti on. This qualify is a twenty- prototypical century phenomenon with experiential roots in the terror attacks of 9/11, the Global pecuniary Crisis, the Arab origin uprisings, and the rise of hacktivism. These global, historical experiences are fostering the rise of cutting-edge and revolutionary IR theory that embraces complexity and multidisciplinarity (Oprisko, 2013). In other words, the trend within IR theory is mirroring the shared experiences of the 21st century renewed emphasis on terror, revolutions over against dissimilitude and favorable-immobility, and the success of hacktivism (ibid.).According to the neoclassical reality theory of IR, the international system determines how states act and behave towards each other because the international system is anarchic and states compete for perspective quo power (Rose, 1998146). In other words, the reaching and ambition of a countrys foreign policy is driven first and fore most by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities (ibid.). The 21st Century, however, is marked not with the political maneuvering of great states with competing visions, but with the elite numerous accumulating power, on the one hand, and the general public, rejecting such elitism, on the other. The first movement toward a revision of the stance quo interpretation of the international system was the 9-11 terrorist attacks. The reaction against this new word form of enemy and the war on terrorism exemplified an master(prenominal) reengagement with the social contract the state, the free authority of the people, was no longer the only(prenominal) independent actor in the international political arena (Oprisko, 2013).Closely think to the payoff of the above-mentioned new enemies there is the metamorphose of the warrantor concept during the last decades. Authors such as Ole Waever or Barry Buzan were some of the most predominant constructivists who define security after the Cold War, which allow ind non- handed-down elements such as human rights (Layman, 2012 4).The place of human rights in security is widely debated. Although onwards the Cold War security was traditionally defined in military terms, since realness was the main school of thought, Constructivism argued for different perspectives, permitting the most thorough definition for security and national interests due to its ability to allow for change in the perception of what defines threats (Layman, 2012 6).Indeed, as Barry Buzan argues, social norms and cultural phenomena dictate what is a security threat (Layman, 2012 6). Waever and Buzan define security as perceived threats to eachthing such as the traditional view of a state to non-traditional views of threats (Buzan et al. 1998 7) which include society, the environment, and economic laws. Threats are, thus, divided into different sectors the military sector, concerned with the armed capabilities of a state the political sec tor, concerned with the stableness of a state the economic sector, concerned with the availableness to resources and the market the societal sector, concerned with the security and sustainability of culture and the environmental sector, concerned with the security of resources (Layman, 2012 8).Thus, the Financial Crisis in 2008 and the subsequent asceticism endured by common citizens hit a breaking-point with the suicide of Tarek al-Tayeb Mohammed Bouazizi in Tunisia in 2010. Dignity-filled love erupted across four continents as the Arab inception spread across the mettle eastward and North Africa and Occupy protests engulfed Europe and North the States (Oprisko, 2013). As we progress from the competing idealist traditions of the 20th Century, the emphasis from structural impositions are waning (ibid.). Human social agents and social structures are plebeianly constitutive, and social change can proceed causally in both directions simultaneously from agents to structures and fr om structures to agents (Bennett, 2003 489)U.S. Contradictory Approach to the center(a) einsteiniumBearing in mind the previously set forth theoretical framework, the effect American national interests at s gain in the centerfield East over decades should not come as a surprise namely protect the U.S. homeland from the threats international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction ensuring the free confidential information of oil, vital to the U.S., regional, and global economies ensuring the security of Israel (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 48) discourage interstate impinge that can threaten allies and other interests ensuring transit and access to facilities to support U.S. military operations countering terrorism and stemming the proliferation of weapons (Arieff et al., 2012 1).Over the years, these interests have resulted a series of U.S. policy objectives advancing ArabIsraeli heartsease, protecting tombstone oil-producing states, limiting the spread of regional conflicts, or ensuring U.S. military access and license of action within the region. Consequently, to ensure these objectives, the US has usually behaved as a status quo power in the nerve center East, prioritizing the regional balance of power and a plastered order over backing political change (ibid).During the past 50 years, the U.S. has play two dueling roles in the Middle East, that of a promoter of liberal ideals, willing to hire war to build democracy, and that of a supporter of dictators who adhere to American interests and ensure stability (Shore, 2012). It can be said, thus, that the U.S. reaction to the Arab start uprisings has exemplified these two opposing policies. maculation the US was quick to defend the peaceful protesters in Egypt and oppressed citizens of Libya, taking whatever obligatory measures to prevent gross humanitarian crimes, the U.S. has issued superficial more than formal warnings to the fact that Syrians are being killed under Assads rule, Bahrain is ge ological fault down on protestors, and Yemen is moving towards hazard (ibid.).However, the U.S. load to stability and the status quo part sustained the regional stagnant economic, political and social systems, leading to the rise of Islamism and Salafism. afterward failing to overthrow the authoritarian regimes of the region, from the nineties, terrorism came to focus. Thus, and itemly after the attacks of kinsfolk 11, 2001, the hegemonic interest in the Saudi monarchy -as the largest oil producer- came into conflict with American national security priorities (Kitchen, 2012 54).However, after 9-11 the U.S. determined that the regions authoritarian regimes were actually the root of the terrorist problem, prescribing, thus, democracy as the solution to the Middle Easts socio-economic issues (Kitchen, 2012 54). Thus, in 2003, the pubic hair organisation launched the freedom Agenda, asserting that stability could not be purchased at the expense of liberty, punctuate that prom oting democracy was not upright more or less promoting American values, but was in the American national interest, since oppressive regimes created the conditions for base of operationsization and terrorism (ibid).However, the immunity Agenda as part of the wider war on terror had obvious contradictions. While on the one hand the US was seeking short-term counter-terrorism measures through the security apparatus of allied authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, it was prioritizing the long-term emancipation of Middle Eastern societies to address the deeper roots of marginalization and underdevelopment (Kitchen, 2012 54).It could be argued that these contradictions were the background to the US response to the events of the Arab escape (Kitchen, 2012 55).The Obama Administration and the U.S. Strategy In The Middle EastEven though the uprisings and political change in the Arab world have challenged many of the assumptions that have long informed U.S. policy makers, it can be said that many long-standing U.S. goals in the region endure (Arieff et al. 2012 1).The Bush administrations response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, overturned this preference for the status quo. The incursion of Iraq created a power vacuum in the disconnectedness that Iran tried to fill. The war listless the U.S. military, spread sectarianism and refugees throughout the region, and unleashed a civil war. The Global War on Terror as well as brought the US into out-of-the-way(prenominal) more collaboration with Arab security function (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 48). The Bush administration failed to match its magniloquence on democracy with meaningful support for representative change (ibid).The legacies of Obamas antecedents war on terror had to be addressed, in order change the US credibility and standing in the MENA region (Kitchen, 2012 55). Thus, during President Obamas first term, the U.S. announced its desire for a sweet-scented start with the Muslim worl d, which started by withdrawing the U.S. military presence from Iraq and scaling down the welt excesses of the War on Terror, man maintaining a lower-key counter-terrorism campaign. While the administration has not managed to adjourn the Iranian thermo thermonu distinctly challenge, it has assembled an international consensus and sozzled sanctions to pressure Tehran. Obama also made the peace accomplish a top priority, although his efforts prove no more successful than his antecedents. Then the Arab efflux erupted, reshaping the regional schedule (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 49).It has been said that the events of the Arab Spring took Obamas Administration by surprise and underprepared (Kitchen, 2012 55). While the political reform was in the overarching interests of the US, and was both sustainable in the region and compatible with Americas other priorities (ibid 56), the White House, however, was crazy that over-enthusiastic American support could undermine the revolutions au thenticity. Thus, Obamas rhetoric in public was cautious, as he sought to balance competing interests in the condition of uncertain events, while at the same time the administration employ its long-developed relationships in the region to try to number developments (ibid.).Egypt constitutes a clear example of this flaccid situation. While the clear win for the Muslim Brotherhood did not fall within the U.S. s expectations and interests in that country in particular, the following military coup, although morally obscure (at least in the 21st Century), has simply been challenged. Indeed, having a military regime that wants to maintain the peace with Israel, is likely the most sluttish option for the U.S. in a region where nothing is settled so far. despite the massive changes across the Middle East ever since 2011, there are cool it several rapidly evolving dynamics that any viable U.S. strategy must written report for. First, the so-called Arab Spring has altered key re gional dynamics, regime perceptions of internal and outside(a) threats, and the role of different political actors, whereby a mobilized public opinion has an unprecedented role in regional politics. Second, Iranian nuclear and hegemonic ambitions continue to worry its neighbors, Israel, and the West. Third, while root word has suffered organizational and political setbacks, its affiliates have change in disconcerting ways. Fourth, the IsraeliPalestinian issue continues to be a core element of regional instability and a source of potential violence (Khal and Lynch, 2013 41).The Arab Spring and the US Interests Challenges and OpportunitesIn response to the Arab uprisings, the Obama Administration has interpreted a reactive approach, trying to congeal U.S. regional policies while coping with six-fold ongoing crises (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 49).In 2011, when addressing the impact of the Arab Spring on U.S. interests, Obama admitted the unsustainability of the status quo and advocated relations base not only on mutual interests and mutual respect but also on a set of principles, including resistor to the use of violence and repression support for a set of universal rights and support for political and economic reform in the MENA region that can meet the legitimate aspirations of unexceptional people throughout the region (Keiswetter, 2012 4).However, contradictions were again inevitable. Although the administration recognized the importance of seeking to change in Egypt and across the region, it was chop-chop pulled up at the prospect of foe with Saudi Arabia over a possible political transformation in Bahrain (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 49). Similarly, while the administration recognized the need for democratic change in the region, allowing, thus, the democratic process to develop even when elections produced Islamist victors (as it happened in Tunisia and Egypt), it always resisted calls for a more costly and dotty intervention in Syria (ibid.).Despite the Adm inistration embracing democratic reform and public engagement, a workable strategy to action these principles has yet to be put in place (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 49). Indeed, even when sensible policies were pursued, they have frequently not been communicated strategically, which transmits uncertainty active American priorities in the region.Given the current environment in the Middle East, any attempt to draw a more coherent approach must conduct five strategic dilemmasFirst, maintaining the free flow of oil whitethorn require big-boned security ties with Gulf regimes, which would affix the U.S. addiction on the least democratic and iron-fist thought governments in the region. This dependence would undermine the U.S. spongelike power with the Arab public and may make for to the emergent SunniShiite Cold War in the region (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 51). The Saudis, among others, have been able to hatch for the disruptions caused by the Libyan events. Thus, a healthful US commitm ent to the security of the Gulf will be vital to oil market stability in the hereafter(a) (Keiswetter, 2012 2). It could be said, thus, that the main challenge for the U.S. here will be being able to maintain traditional allies while supporting the democratic values it has been eer defending.Second, while a U.S. presence throughout the region and close cooperation with partner governments security services may be requirement for combating terrorism, this American military presence in the Arab world will continue to declare oneself extremists with propaganda and recruitment opportunities (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 51). The Arab Spring uprisings, based on universal values and rooted in the demand for jobs, justice and dignity, highlight the unsuccessful person of Islamic extremism sanctioning violence as the only way to obtain societal changes (Keiswetter, 2012 2). While none of the 2011 uprisings in the Middle East was led by Islamist movements or had an Islamist agenda (Dalacoura, 2012 74), Islamist movements have proved to wellbeing from them politically (ibid 75). Indeed, the upheavals provide opportunities, as it happened in Yemen, for Islamic extremists to gain ground (Keiswetter, 2012 2). As exemplified before with the case of Egypt, the U.S. faces the challenge of having Islamist regimes freely elected in stagnant countries, whereby radical movements are like to mushroom, or take an active role in the future political direction of the region, which will probably lead to international criticism.Third, tilting toward Israel in the Palestinian conflict may be infixed to reassure Washingtons commitment to Israels security (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 50). However, Israeli leaders argue that the wave of unrest in the Arab world is endangering Israels security by potentially replacing relatively complaisant neighboring governments with Islamist and potentially hostile governments (Arieff et al., 2012 3).Fourth, a forceful military U.S. intervention in Syria coul d hasten the demise of Assads regime, snub humanitarian suffering, demonstrate leadership, and weaken Iran. However, such intervention would also require a major investment of military resources, move the US to the protracted commitment that it just escaped in Iraq, and consuming resources requisite to deal with Iran and other global contingencies (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 50).Fifth, the ill-defined prospects for democratic change. The consensus in Washington from the 1990s has been that democratization will lead to the emergence in the Middle East of regimes which are supportive of the U.S. (Dalacoura, 2012 78). However, the Middle East has been describe as immune to the waves of democratization which have transformed other regions. Moreover, focusing upkeep on democracy in the Middle East has been criticized for reflecting the priorities of western and in particular American political science (ibid 71). On political and economic reform, the nature of the democratic political syst ems in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya clay to be seen (Keiswetter, 2012 2). Indeed, one of the U.S. greatest fears is credibility in what new Middle East will emerge from the current turmoil (Shore, 2012).Sixth, it can be said that Irans nuclear and regional hegemonic aspirations are one of the major pre-Arab Spring concerns for the US. It is feared that a nuclear-armed Tehran would increase its support for militancy, terrorism, and subversion in the Levant, Iraq, and the Gulf, which would gain ground destabilize the region (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 43). Thus, Irans nuclear program could have a important impact on regional politics (ibid.).Seventh, the Arab Spring has shown the limits of American power in the Middle East. Both the U.S. and Europe are missing the necessary financial resources to bring prospects in the Arab Spring countries. Thus, investment will also have to come from countries, such as the Gulf states or China, who do not share to the same termination the Western interes t in payoff of democratic values (Keiswetter, 2012 2).In any case, the ultimate strategic effects of these changes are not clear. Many fear the emerging power of Islamist movements, elected or fierce (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 43). The anti-American protests in September 2012 in response to a YouTube video, and the uneven governmental responses to the crisis were a clear sign of the central turbulence which might complicate future U.S. policy in the region. In other words, the emerging regional order combines a complex array of contradictory new trends (ibid.).In light of the Arab uprisings, it is highly important to rank political and economic reform. However, push reform complicates ties with key autocratic partners, may cause a nationalist pass in some democratizing states, and may also risk empowering Islamist groups less inclined to befriend with the US (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 51).ConclusionA major question that remains to be answered is whether the uprisings will eventually lea d to the democratization of the Middle East and the end of the authoritarianism that has undermined its political life (Dalacoura, 2012 79).On the one hand, the most immediate prospects for the Arab Spring are continuing instabilities as states try to solve their political and economic situations, as well as their relations with other countries rising influence for those countries with the necessary resources to back up their policies and the continuation of a panoptical but attenuated role for the U.S. (Keiswetter, 2012 2). The long-term prospect, on the other hand, includes also the hatchway Middle East with a much higher degree of freedom, more democratic, happy and accountable, less abusive of human rights, and thus a net positive way out for U.S. interests (ibid.). With the dramatic rise in touristed activism empowered by the new technologies, it is clear that long-term stability in the region will require meaningful steps by all governments towards a veridical political and economic reform (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 42). The U.S. has had to go a fine line between support for its values and long-term interests represent by political reform in the region-, and the protection of its core regional interests (Kitchen, 2012 57).If the U.S. is serious about turning off its Middle detour, then in the Middle East and North Africa the US needs to prioritize long-term trends over short-term concerns, which may not always mean thrust for revolutionary change in support of democratic values in the region (Kitchen, 2012 58).The recent revolutions pose an prospect to relieve oneself a new status quo in the Middle East, free an oppressed and out of work youth, increase economic standing and trade, and break up democracy a chance to flourish. 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